Welcome Home: reconciliation, Vietnam veterans, and the reconstruction of Anzac under the Hawke government

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Abstract

On October 3, 1987, around 22,000 Vietnam veterans marched in a ‘Welcome Home’ parade through the streets of Sydney (Ross 2009, 212). It was estimated that the parade was watched by a crowd of up to 100,000, including Prime Minister Hawke, and that it stood up to ten deep along the parade route in some places (Sydney Morning Herald 5 October 1987, 4). The marchers carried more than 500 Australian flags, each flag representing a serviceman who had lost their life during the Vietnam War. These simple acts represented the reconciliatory nature of the event – the flags, standing for the nation-state, were accepted as a proper symbol for the fallen by the veterans and symbolised their reconciliation with the body politic that they felt had rejected their rightful place in the Anzac narrative after the end of the Vietnam conflict. The large crowd that watched and cheered the parade, including the political head of state, Prime Minister Hawke, demonstrated the sincere regret the body politic felt at the treatment of veterans and their welcoming into the Anzac tradition.

This paper seeks to explore the role that Hawke played in reconciling these parties and the discursive inclusion of Vietnam veterans into the Anzac narrative. In doing so, it assumes that national identity and conceptions of the nation-state are socially constructed (see Anderson 1983; Hobsbawn 2005) and that national leaders play an important role in facilitating and actively creating this process. Drawing upon Pekonen’s (1989) observation that a discourse of consensus sets the boundaries of the political, it argues that Hawke’s reconciliation of Vietnam veterans was partial and compares his response to the events of the 1987 Welcome Home parade with the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990. An expanded version of ‘Accordism’ (Economou 1993) was used by Hawke to facilitate
this process. It will draw upon a corpus of Hawke’s public addresses and utilise Critical Discourse Analysis (see Fairclough 2005) to examine these developments.

_Popular memory of the 1960s portrays the decade as one of radicalism and social change, centred on the opposition to the Vietnam conflict and the radicalisation of university students. This recollection, however, was a more appropriate reflection of the Australia of the 1970s (Pierce 1992, 70). The Australia of the 1960s was a largely conservative country (see Jordens 2009, 75-76; Cochrane 2009). In particular, Jordens argues that Australia’s youth had a deferential attitude towards authority, reflected in opinion polling on the question of the Vietnam conflict and conscription. Further, the conservative Liberal/National coalition won four elections during the decade, in 1961, 1963, 1966 and 1969. During this time, Australians were largely happy to allow Anzac day to be self-governed by the RSL and watch respectfully (if sometimes uncomfortably) from a distance (Macleod 2002, 150)._

Despite this, the rumblings of discontent with Anzac as a central explanatory discourse of nation did feature in this decade. Alan Seymour’s play, _The One Day of the Year_, made its debut in 1960 and challenged the sentimental and unquestioning acceptance of Anzac day, its accepted meaning and its drunken commemoration. By 1965, and the beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict, Macleod (2002) notes a certain ambivalence in the media coverage of that year’s Anzac day and examination of whether the day would continue to hold the same significance. In the same year, Ken Inglis published his seminal investigation into the Anzac tradition and pointed to the role of the official historian of WWI, C.E.W. Bean, in the construction of Anzac (Inglis 1965). As the war in Vietnam rolled on and opposition against conscription of citizens began to grow, opposition to Anzac day and its memorialisation also began to appear. Inglis (2001, 377-380) notes several instances during the second half on the 1960s, up until the end of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, of defacement of war memorials in the Australian landscape. In particular, the sole guard of Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance was bashed by unknown assailants before they painted ‘P E A C E !’ on the columns along the front of the Shrine. These instances were largely isolated, though, along with the only recorded protest at the return of Australian servicemen from Vietnam, when a 21 year old
Nadine Jensen, doused in red paint, smeared marching soldier’s uniforms in 1966 (Curthoys 1994, 129). Save Our Sons, a women-led movement, staged a silent protest on Anzac day 1966 at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance and led other such protests at events when conscripts left for Vietnam (Jordens 2009, 79). More generally, the anti-war movement that sprang up surrounding the Vietnam conflict, the well-attended and publicised Moratorium marches and the increasing pessimism surrounding the conflict after the 1968 Tet Offensive all helped to problematise Anzac as a central national discourse (Curthoys 2009, 156).

By the time the ALP had been elected to power in 1972, the observance and even the acceptance of Anzac day as a central national commemorative date had been challenged. The Whitlam government had been elected with a mandate for change, and for many Australians the election of the Whitlam government was a vehicle to break free from some of the more restrictive elements of the post-war Coalition years (Alomes, 1988). The Whitlam government asserted a more independent and self-consciously Australian form of identity and nationalism, differentiated from the British race patriotism which had previously dominated Australian life during the 20th century (Curran 2006). The conservative orthodoxy on discourses of Australian identity, with its traditional associations with Britain, white Australia and the militaristic mythology of values associated with the actions of white, male diggers at Gallipoli was replaced with ‘new nationalism’ (Alomes 1988) and the beginnings of multiculturalism. There was little place for Anzac in the multicultural, post-Vietnam discourse of Whitlam as symbolic changes, such as the favouring of an Australian honours system over the traditional imperial honours system, the changing of the national anthem and funding Australian arts and cultural programs, were instituted. Pierce (1992, 71-72) further notes that this period of the early 1970s saw increasing industrial militancy and the institutionalisation of radicalism in the curriculum of Australian tertiary institutions. These shifts helped to substantially change the meaning of Australia identity and nationalist discourse under Whitlam.

The 1975 dismissal and the subsequent election of Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister saw a shift nationalism once again. Fraser went about reversing some of the symbols of new nationalism, for example, reverting to the use of ‘God Save the Queen’ as the national anthem and returning to recommending Australians for imperial honours,
alongside the Australian honours system introduced by Whitlam. However, despite these symbolic changes, Brett (2003) argues that some of the policy changes that Whitlam brought about were politically difficult to reverse. Thus, elements of new nationalism, multiculturalism and their associated identity discourses were left in place. Fraser, like Whitlam, grappled with the need to develop a more inclusive and distinctly Australian identity. The influx of not only European, but now Asian immigration following the end of the Vietnam War, had further challenged Anglo-Celtic centric versions of national identity. Fraser was suspicious of the excesses of the aggressive nationalism that was developing popularly during this period (Curran, 2006), and sought to steer clear of some of the radically nationalist tendencies associated with Australia’s experiences at Gallipoli and the new nationalism discourse of the Whitlam era. Like Whitlam before him, Fraser was distrustful of Anzac discourse, and the image of the white digger at Gallipoli did not sit comfortably with his liberal embrace of multiculturalism. More generally, attendances at Anzac day parades declined during the 1970s (Smith 2001, 93) as Anzac became a contested and political feature of Australian identity and national discourse.

The early 1980s saw the continued contestation of Anzac, along with increasingly radical and confrontationist opposition from some groups. The early 1980s was a time of heightened Cold War tension and the peace, anti-nuclear and environmental social movements were active in contesting previously settled conceptions of the national interest (Elder 2005, 74). Further, the radical feminist group Women Against Rape (WAR) conducted a number of protests on Anzac days in the early 1980s at several capital city locations around Australia. Their purpose was to challenge the mythology of Anzac day by emphasising rape in war, militarism, and male violence, in an attempt to broaden the meaning of the day to include ‘…the universal experience of women in war’ (Howe 1995, 304). The movement began to decline in the mid-1980s as disagreements about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these protests drained the impetus to follow through with continued action (Inglis 2001, 467), but the significance was that Anzac was being challenged in a radical manner in the public sphere. The challenge to Anzac had moved from isolated, individual actions, to a collective and very public confrontation. Anzac, and its primacy in the national narrative, was being contested head on.
It was in this environment in 1983 that the Hawke government was elected under the election slogan ‘Bringing Australia Together’. The immediate aim of the slogan was appealing to concerns about the divisions rent to the Australian polity by Fraser’s term in office, but the more lasting consequence of the ALP’s electoral campaign in government was a discursive call for unity, consensus and reconciliation. This appeal to consensus was especially concerned with the corporatist mediation of labour, business and government interests (Johnson 1989, 102) and the management of dissent, with the ultimate goal being to develop and maintain a healthy capitalist economy. Mills (1993, 26) argues that Hawke’s appeal to consensus was based upon his materialist conception of aspiration – that the polity was interested in the maintenance, and improvement, of material well-being. This was to be achieved through negotiation and bargaining ‘and the creation of a forum for resolving the divisions which distract groups from satisfying their shared material aspirations’ (Mills 1993, 26).

Pekonen (1989, 136) argues that consensus politics, such as Hawke’s, denies the political. That is, it is a discursive attempt to define the limits of acceptable policy action by omitting the range of potential possibilities; potential action has been replaced by consensus regarding the presented option. In the case of Hawke, consensus had two important discursive consequences; firstly, it built a powerful claim to incumbency based upon the delivery of a mediated, consensual agreement between the forces of labour and business regarding the mutual goal of material well-being. Secondly, it discursively excluded political action by those who might oppose this conception of government action, as opposition to consensus, self-interest and the attainment of material security was illogical, churlish or down-right dangerous. Thus, both Johnson (1989, 105) and Moore (2003, 124-126) note that political action based upon class difference was excised from Hawke’s political discourse. There was no place for approaches to policy making which fostered division and dissidence in Hawke’s government, despite the ALP’s labourist tradition.
This form of policy making was operationalised by what Economou (1993) has called ‘Accordism’. This had four implications:

First, it indicated the extent to which the government was able to incorporate hitherto antagonistic groups into a process of dialogue and negotiation in the name of seeking consensus in the national interest… Secondly, the post-summit Accord process revealed that interest groups would rather a proactive, participatory role rather than a reactive role in the policy-formulation process… Thirdly, [it] indicated the potential for creating bureaucratic structures within which the politics of consensus could be played out… Finally, the Accord process began to emerge as a model for the conduct of policy-formation in areas beyond the confines of industrial and economic policy (Economou 1993, 402).

This final point can be seen in the areas like environmental policy (Economou 1993), Aboriginal policy (Jennett 1990) and the bureaucratisation of the feminist movement (Sawer 1989). Hawke encouraged the formation of peak bodies and elite engagement by negotiating with the leaders of these groups – ‘If they had a leader, Hawke could negotiate with them’ (Mills 1993, 27). In regards to the veteran community, Hawke engaged the Returned and Services League (RSL) regularly as PM, having addressed the annual RSL national conference on at least five occasions in 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990, and 1991. The addresses both engaged the veteran community as an important lobbying constituency, personalised the policy process and helped Hawke set the policy agenda.

The 1980s and the response of Vietnam veterans

By the early 1980s, and in the context of continued contestation surrounding Anzac, Vietnam veterans began to organise politically. Veterans were dissatisfied with their treatment by government and the wider public after their return from war, as there was widespread apathy and indifference to their experience (Ross 2009; Curthoys 1994). As Ross (2009, 188) notes:
The popularly accepted stereotype of the returning Vietnam digger was that he was whisked from the jungle by helicopter and then flown home, to arrive at an airport at midnight, there to be met by family and demonstrators. Then he went back to normality where people either had not noticed that he had been away, or else attacked and jeered because he had been fighting in an unpopular war. His reaction, supposedly, was to deny his experiences, to himself and to others.

The truth was somewhat different. Curthoys notes (1994, 124-125) that all sixteen battalions that toured Vietnam received a welcome home parade, though some soldiers returned individually and did not (Ross 2009, 188-190). Further, the anti-war movement was largely sympathetic to the experiences of the returned servicemen, although some instances of hostility have been noted by returned servicemen (Curthoys 1994, 126). The experience of many returned servicemen (or veterans as they became known, adopting the American synonym) in the 1970s was of apathy, both from the state and from the wider public, although Ross (2009, 211) points out that this was not universal. Discursively, Vietnam veterans had been omitted from the story of Anzac during this period and their dutiful service was being ignored (Doyle 2002, 78). The public and the state began to lose interest in Anzac, no memorials were erected in the landscape to their sacrifice and the state and the RSL seemingly cared little for their concerns about the effects of Agent Orange and their damaged mental health. One veteran interviewed in the late 1980s expressed the memory thusly:

It’s not that I was ashamed I was in Vietnam, but I’d been given the feeling I should be ashamed. I mean it was obvious at that time we were going to lose, so you had no comeback. For a man that was a dedicated Australian, and thought I was doing the right thing, it was very hurtful…

We were fighting a war that was not only unpopular, no one had a clue where we were. Young blokes of twenty were dying for their country through no choice of their own, and the people didn’t know and couldn’t care less (Brett and Moran 2006, 86).
This divide was exacerbated by the social-economic and political gap between the mostly conservative, lower-middle class and rural working-class veterans and the urban, middle-class anti-war movement participants (Curthoys 1994, 130).

To respond to this neglect, and especially to press for an investigation into the effects of exposure to Agent Orange, the Vietnam Veterans Association (VVA, and formerly the Vietnam Veterans Action Association) began to coalesce as a pressure group in 1979-80 (Ross 2009, 195). Doyle points out that this group has never represented the majority of the 50,000 Vietnam veterans, at its peak only managing to claim 15,000 members (Doyle 2002, 80). But it has been successful in presenting itself as the voice of veterans, despite differences amongst veterans as to the need for political representation. This diversity of viewpoints amongst veterans as a political constituency adds complexity to their narrative, one often unacknowledged by the stereotyping of veterans outlined above.

In the early 1980s the VVA was an active pressure group, and was successful in lobbying the federal government to take action on veteran health problems, including both mental and physical trauma, in pressing for studies into veterans’ health complaints and for a Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange. However, the Royal Commission did not find in favour of the VVA’s concerns about the effects of Agent Orange and a proposal to continue research into veteran mortality, after a pilot study, was declined funding by the federal government (Doyle 2002, 84). The VVA continued to campaign against Agent Orange ‘…as if it felt that any other grounds, such as PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome], diminished the veterans self-image’ (Doyle 2002, 84).

Hawke’s responded to these demands via the RSL, using their national conferences to address the concerns of Vietnam veterans. Soon after the tabling of the findings of the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange, Hawke told the RSL’s national conference:

> The report’s central finding is that the chemical agents, by and large, had no adverse effects on Australian personnel. The government accepts that the case for a link between Agent Orange and health problems among Vietnam Veterans has not been established.
However, both the government and the RSL need to be aware that the physical and psychological sufferings of the Vietnam veterans are real enough, whether or not they were caused by Agent Orange. Mr Justice Evatt is clearly stating that the main task, caring for Vietnam veterans, is still continuing.

I can assure all of you that here today that we will be looking very carefully at the report’s recommendations in the light of this government’s demonstrated commitment to providing optimum care for the veterans of all wars (Hawke, 1985).

At this point, Hawke was largely reactive to the challenges being posed by the VVA. Having instituted the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange early in his term as PM, there was a need to respond to its findings. However, there was also the need to manage expectations – the Royal Commission’s findings were not what the VVA had wanted – and by presenting the government’s position to the leading veterans organisation, the RSL, the VVA could be kept at arm’s length. Thus we see rather bland assurances from Hawke, *we will be looking very carefully at the report’s recommendations*, rather than specific commitments that directly addressed the VVA’s concerns regarding Agent Orange and its effects. Hawke presumably chose to present this here, as the RSL had opposed the Royal Commission in the first place and could plausibly be considered to be sympathetic, rather than to a hostile VVA audience, but also, Hawke could hardly announce new spending when his government was tightening access to veterans disability pensions, an issue he addressed earlier in this speech (Hawke 1985). Hawke’s Accordism model is in effect in this instance – interaction with a peak representative body, with dissident parties to the outcome being marginalised.

However, this period also saw some tentative use of Anzac and the beginning of reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. Hawke acknowledges in the 1985 RSL conference address that veterans claims’ to suffering were *real enough*, and cautioned against the RSL or government treating it as anything but. Thus, whilst there was little new offered Vietnam veterans in this period in terms of tangible policy action, the government did announce that new war memorials were to be constructed,
petitioned the Turkish government to re-name the section of beach where Australian troops landed at Gallipoli ‘Anzac Cove’, helped send surviving diggers overseas to mark the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1985, and made a speech on Anzac day in 1986 in Greece, the first Anzac day address of his term. In this setting, veterans in Australian picked up on the idea of a Welcome Home parade similar to the ones conducted in the United States, where veterans would march through city streets to a welcoming and appreciative public. As Ross (2009, 198) argues, veterans of the Vietnam war ‘…want recognition, reconciliation; they want the community to be grateful to ex-servicemen and respect them for having served in Vietnam.’ The Welcome Home parade was a means to further this end.

Welcome Home: Vietnam veterans and reconciliation

The Welcome Home parade in Sydney in 1987 was the tipping point in the reconciliation between veterans, the government and the wider public. Having been floated as a potential option after the precedential American parades in 1986, a organising committee was set up and was supported by veterans organisations, the NSW RSL and some local Sydney government representatives (Doyle 2002, 86). Hawke, too, took up the proposal enthusiastically, telling the August 1987 RSL conference:

I firmly believe that the October parade will be the culmination of a long process of reconciliation and community acceptance of its obligations to the veterans of Vietnam.

I believe we must honestly acknowledge that our involvement in Vietnam did cause deep divisions in the Australian community.

But whatever our individual views on the merits of Australian involvement, we must equally acknowledge the commitment, courage and integrity of our armed forces who served in Vietnam.
No one should have ever questioned those characteristics – not should anyone ever have questioned our community obligations to the Vietnam veterans (Hawke 1987).

The sincerity of this reconciliation is emphasised by Hawke’s personal commitment *I firmly believe; I believe*. The terms of the reconciliation are unambiguous *No one should have questioned* and the imperativeness of the cause is emphasised *no one; we must*. Hawke attended the October parade and his presence, as the political head of government, signified the reconciliation of the state with Vietnam veterans and their place in Anzac as a national narrative (although some veterans rejected his presence by declining to give eyes right as they marched by Hawke). The terms of this reconciliation are what Andrew Schaap (2005, 13) calls restorative justice. Under this concept, an offender has violated the established norms and limits of acceptability of their community. The wrong-doer, having recognised the injustice of their actions and felt the guilt associated with such a violation, seeks to right their wrong via repentance – a disowning of their prior actions and attendance to their wrongdoing through apology, reparation and penance. Having sufficiently attended to these rituals, and the victim having accepted that the wrongdoer is sufficiently chastened and willing to accept community norms, results in the offender being forgiven and the parties are consequently reconciled. Schaap argues that this process of restorative justice insufficiently addresses the political. Reconciliation is here unification – a redeeming of a painful past in order to pursue a common future (Schaap 2005, 18).

In these terms, the reconcilability of political conflict is taken for granted. By promoting social harmony as an unconditional public good, the terms within which this unity is constituted are presented as unambiguous. Consequently, the representational space in which the terms of reconciliation itself might be contested is diminished… The aspiration to reconcile becomes unpolitical then, when accompanied by a forgetfulness that the ‘we’ it seeks to realise is not a given but the contingent outcome of interaction.’ (Schaap, 2005, 20-21).

The notion of restorative justice leading to the unpolitical is of particular importance in this occasion. Having marginalised the experience of Vietnam veterans, excising them from the discursive narrative of Anzac and allowing Anzac as a central national
narrative to wither, the state, along with the Australian body politic, had committed a grievous wrong against established societal norms. To repent, elaborate public rituals such as the Royal Commission into the use of Agent Orange, the Welcome Home parade, and the Vietnam Veterans war memorial that was announced in 1988 and opened in 1992, are all used to atone for the sins of the past. This atonement is repeated at Anzac day every year, as a reminder not to violate these principles again and restoring the order that had been disturbed. However, the nature of restorative justice precludes any contestation of the terms of the reconciliation – it becomes unpolitical. The offender cannot contest the terms of the reconciliation because to do so would fail to show the adequate level of repentance and enrage the victim, causing further, if not more, hurt. This had profound continuing effects as Anzac became the sacred, untouchable political discourse. Opposition is marginalised as the originary meaning of Anzac centring on Gallipoli is restored as a central national narrative. Veterans’ continuing contestation of their claims to policy action by government and incorporation of their particular experience of war is subsumed in the official and sanitised story of the Anzac tradition. Those who might oppose the utilisation of militaristic imagery as the foundational story of nationhood are also marginalised, as opposition may open old wounds once again. This incontestability leaves Anzac left open to elites, such as Hawke, who wish to use the power of the state to define the terms which the body politic can engage with a central national narrative, projecting their agenda onto an incontestable discursive realm.

‘The commitment is all’: Anzac day 1990 and Anzac as ideograph

After the 1987 Welcome Home parade, the public expression of the contestability of Anzac declined. Protests, such the ones led by WAR activists, fell away. The 70th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli in 1985, and especially the 75th anniversary in 1990 saw renewed interest in Anzac and explanation of its continued meaning. Smith (2001, 93) notes that this is a time when attendances at Anzac day parades began to increase again. New war memorials were announced or unveiled, including the Hellenic memorial, the Australian Army memorial and the Vietnam Veterans memorial (Inglis 2001, 404 - 405). On Anzac day eve, 1989, Hawke gave a wide ranging speech on his government’s achievements regarding veterans’ affairs to a group attending the opening of a new wing to a repatriation hospital. This included
the acknowledgement of Vietnam veterans and their ‘special difficulties since their
return to Australia’ (Hawke 1989) and his government’s response to these needs. He
further announced that the government had agreed to assist a group of very elderly
Gallipoli veterans to make the ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the
landings (Hawke 1989). Further, he ‘as Prime Minister’ thought it appropriate and
‘deeply moving in a personal sense to be there’ (Hawke 1989, 4).

Thus, Hawke, the Gallipoli veterans and a large party of support staff and 70
journalists travelled to the Gallipoli peninsula for the April 25 commemoration
(Macleod 2002, 154). The trip lasted three days and consisted of three ceremonies – a
dawn service; an international service, attended by, among others, Hawke, Opposition
Leader John Hewson, the Governor-General of New Zealand, the President of Turkey,
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the French Secretary of State for Veterans
Affairs and an ambassador from the Federal Republic of Germany; and a service at
Lone Pine, where Hawke gave his Anzac day address. The 75th anniversary of the
landings at Gallipoli did not display the same level of acknowledgement displayed in
the 1987 Welcome Home parade or the 1989 announcement. In the three major set
speeches that Hawke gave over this trip, mention was never made of the Vietnam
experience (see Hawke 1990a; Hawke 1990b; Hawke 1990c). Neither was it
mentioned in interviews that Hawke gave over this period. The main set piece for the
trip at Lone Pine on Anzac day was to a general Australian audience, and was where
we might expect Hawke to explain the continuing meaning of Anzac in greatest detail:

[T]he meaning of the ANZAC tradition, forged in the fires of Gallipoli, must
be learned anew, from generation to generation.

Its meaning can endure only as long as each new generation of Australians
finds the will to reinterpret it - to breathe, as it were, new life into the old
story… (Hawke 1990a).

Given the recent and very public reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the
body politic, this new interpretation might be expected to include the voices of those
who had been marginalised from the Anzac tradition. However:
In that recognition of the special meaning of Australian mateship, the self-recognition of their dependence upon one another - these Australians, by no means all of them born in Australia, drawn from every walk of life and different backgrounds, cast upon these hostile shores, twelve thousand miles from home - there lay the genesis of the ANZAC tradition.

And at the heart of that tradition lay a commitment. It was a simple but deep commitment to one another, each to his fellow Australian.

And in that commitment, I believe, lies the enduring meaning of ANZAC, then and today and for the future.

It is that commitment, now as much as ever now - with all the vast changes occurring in our nation, more than ever - it is that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, what it is to be an Australian. The commitment is all (Hawke 1990a).

Having helped reconcile the body politic, Vietnam veterans and Anzac, Hawke was free to use Anzac as a sacred, incontestable ideograph (McGee 1980). Anzac was, at once, pregnant with meaning and significance about national identity, national values and lessons for the present but also vague, unspecific and malleable, too. So, in this instance, Anzac becomes a vehicle for Hawke’s standard discursive message of consensus – the commitment is all. The diggers’ commitment to each other, mateship, serves as a metaphor for the present appeal to citizens’ commitment to the Australian state, and to the policy program of economic reform by the Hawke government. The significance of the message is amplified by the meaning and sacredness of Anzac. Thus, the uncomfortable message of the Welcome Home parades – that war damages its participants and continues to do so long after conflict has ended – is lost in the sanitised version of the Anzac tradition presented by Hawke.

Conclusion

The 75th anniversary commemoration of the Gallipoli landings demonstrated the discursive limits of Hawke’s reincorporation of Vietnam veterans. By the 1992
opening of the Vietnam veterans memorial on Anzac Parade in Canberra. Hawke had been rolled by Paul Keating as PM and Doyle (2002, 93) notes that some in the veteran community saw the event as ‘…more about medals, national honours, and other paraphernalia of glorification, and less about solving the ongoing dilemmas of the veteran community.’ However, the most significant legacy was the continuing effect of Anzac. Hawke’s discursive reconciliation had helped to establish Anzac as a national ideograph and, once again, as a sacred discursive construction of national identity and purpose. The 1990s saw continued and increasing interest and participation in Anzac day commemorations (or by then, perhaps, celebrations) by the Australian public and the continued use of Anzac as ideograph by Keating and then John Howard. Consensus regarding Anzac appears to have been achieved.
References


