Democracy, Cosmopolitanism and Human Equality

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Abstract
In a post Cold-War world riven with ‘minor’ conflicts, and a West cowering under the intermittent threat of terrorist attack, human equality and sodality (fraternity and sorority) require urgent review. Among interesting proposals for a theoretical foundation to human equality is Martha Nussbaum’s call for a revived, modern version of Stoicism. She argues that it would be a triumph of Stoicism if children everywhere could be taught indifference to race and goodwill toward neighbours. Yet in her anxiety to avoid ‘teleologies’ (surprising in an avid Aristotelian), Nussbaum denatures Stoicism by disconnecting it from its transcendent foundations. Lisa Hill understands this, but argues that the cosmopolitanism of both the Stoics and their Cynic predecessors is prior to the state. While it may take deontological precedence, the origins of Cynicism and Stoicism were firmly rooted in the democratic state. Even if Diogenes fashioned his beliefs around rejection of state authority and polite society, he could scarcely live without them, and located his famous barrel at the centre of town.

A problem for the modern world is to maintain the authority of states, with their capacity to produce relief for the poor and oppressed along with their capacity to dominate, while having them absorb the ideals of cosmopolitanism into their own policy-formation. This would imply treating refugees and asylum-seekers as fellow human beings endowed with dignity, equal with citizens, and not as illegals or undesirable aliens. It is incumbent on the democratic state, the progenitor of the cosmopolitanism of both Cynicism and Stoicism, to promote the ideals of human dignity and equality. Nussbaum’s Stoicism scarcely helps, but there are globalizing organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, and globalized religious bodies, as advanced by Hans Küng, Fred Dallmayr and Joseph Camilleri, which supply the institutional foundation lacking in Nussbaum’s denatured Stoicism.

The current refugee crisis is part of the world-wide tragedy of misplaced and threatened people. In Australia the crisis is not a case of the ‘vast number’ of asylum seekers (minuscule in international perspective) seeking to invade our borders, but a crisis of political leadership. We have been subject to a series of monumental failures on the part of successive Australian governments to carry out their obligations in terms of humane treatment of displaced persons. The contemptible aspect of these policies is the concerted effort to disparage the wretched in the eyes of the public, suggesting that their plight is a result of a conscious choice or their own innate inferiority. After excoriating the boat people who were falsely alleged to have thrown their children into the sea, John Howard righteously announced that Australia would not welcome ‘people like that’. Their standards of behavior were obviously well below that of Australian cultural norms.
Julia Gillard sought to redirect boat people to Malaysia, a policy opposed by the Abbott opposition for its own cynical purposes. The fictitious notion of a queue of deserving displaced persons was reinforced by the assertion that refugees should receive ‘no advantage’ through travelling by boat, an outrageous suggestion that people who had been uprooted, who had lost everything, and who would in desperation risk the perils of the deep, would be in competition with other unfortunates and seek an ‘advantage’ over them. This was pathetic public policy in its attempt to obfuscate the situation of asylum seekers. In his first term as Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, presenting a humane face to the refugee problem, extravagantly announced that people smugglers should rot in hell for eternity. In his second term, Rudd proclaimed that no boat person would ever be settled in Australia, but that the (near anarchic) state of Papua New Guinea could cope with them, at some enormous undisclosed cost to Australia’s bribery dressed up as aid.

Behind all the policy gyrations is the ugly Australian inheritance that dare not speak its name: racism. The veiled disparagements of ‘queue jumpers’, ‘illegals’ and ‘people like that’ is the dark proposition that asylum seekers are lesser breeds without the law. At the least, there is an implicit downgrading of people according to racial origin, religious beliefs and sheer destitution that, if made explicit, would be criminal breaches of our anti-discrimination laws. The fact that asylum seekers in transit are not Australians puts them beyond the protection of Australian laws, as both the Howard and Rudd governments have carefully arranged. The excuses put up by Rudd are pitiable in that he has persuaded many of his deeply reluctant parliamentary colleagues to repeat the mantra that the ‘no advantage’ and ‘never to be settled’ policies are humane devices to stop people drowning in leaky boats. Although our naval personnel have acted to save drowning people, there is no thought from the government that that could be an actual policy, and some comparison between the costs of diverting and transporting boat people and bribing recipient countries with the cost of systematic rescue would be interesting. The companion mantra is the evil of people smugglers, destined for hell, as though attempting to ease the passage of desperate people was inherently contemptible; the poignant statement of football commentator and former Hungarian refugee, Les Murray, that he owed his life to brave people smugglers throws our leadership’s contentions into repellent starkness; as does the intimate portrait of ‘people smuggler’ and former Abu Ghraib prisoner, Ali Al Jebani, painted by Robin de
Crespieny;\(^1\) or the heart-rending researches of the Edmund Rice Centre led by Philip Glendenning. For our politicians, boat people have no history before they step into a boat; nobody refers to the trials they have gone through getting to Indonesia. There is no doubt that the successive policies are driven entirely by electoral pandering to popular prejudice in marginal seats, and run against the actual beliefs of otherwise benevolent politicians. Courageous leadership would be directed towards reshaping the attitudes of a privileged population towards their less-privileged neighbours.

**Cynic origins of other-worldliness**

One point of optimism is the growing number of thinkers who regard cosmopolitanism as a means of awakening the populations of the world to a vision of human equality. Martha Nussbaum evokes an updated version of ancient Stoicism to regenerate humane feelings among Americans. The term cosmopolitan was first popularized by Diogenes of Sinope, the model Cynic, who announced himself to be a citizen of the world. From his other reflections one would have to think that his reply on citizenship was less directed towards a benevolence for all humankind, than a curt rejection of state membership, a specious reason for rejecting the responsibilities of citizenship.\(^2\) A genuine benevolence was generated by his moderating followers, the Stoics whom Nussbaum recommends. Yet Diogenes’s stance is an example. For all his philosophical denunciation of the cant associated with politics and ‘bourgeois’ manners, he could not live without a community.\(^3\) The famous barrel, in which he lived his ascetic life, was placed at the Metroon, the temple of Cybele located in the middle of the Athenian agora. He had been exiled from his native Sinope, presumably because of his eccentric behavior, but found a home in philosophical Athens. He constantly demanded an audience, which he was wont to attract with a blood-curdling whistle, and then abused them in the manner of a modern stand-up comedian. As a performance artist he shocked people by confronting them with his bodily functions. ‘Diogenes does not erode the discourse of power; he launches a frontal attack.’\(^4\) Along with many legendary figures of the ancient world, Diogenes the person may be undiscourable, but a rich anecdote tradition, captured mainly by the first century Diogenes Laertius (of uncertain date around the second century AD), possibly points to the kind of character he was.\(^5\)
In fact Diogenes stood in a long tradition of Greek philosophers who, from Thales onward, sought a reality behind the mere appearances of things. Heraclitus had postulated a stable *logos* behind all the unknowable flux and instability of the seen world, while Parmenides challenged this view of radical instability with a theory of absolute permanence of all things in which change was a mere human illusion.\(^6\) Plato had created a complex theory of *idea*, or forms, giving an interim shape to all visible things, in turn modified by Aristotle’s theories of developmental forms. The whole tradition searched for truth behind appearance. It was little wonder that Diogenes was characterized by Plato as ‘Socrates gone mad’ when he aped the great man’s interrogatory method in order to displace common understandings about things, particularly in the realm of human custom and behaviour.\(^7\) The Cynics inherited from classical Athens its characteristic of free speech, *parresia*, namely the determination to speak on all subjects, which they expanded into a right to say *really* anything. Naming their philosophy *kunikos*, dog-like, the Cynics rejected the claims of politics and flouted the decencies of conventional society. Their mission, perhaps inspired by the Delphic Oracle, was *paracharättein ta nomisma*, to ‘deface the currency’, or, as they interpreted it, to bring about a transvaluation of standards.\(^8\) They were agonistic, and combated other philosophies, inventing along the way the new literary forms of the diatribe and the satire. A mission it was. Diogenes urged his followers to equip themselves with nothing other than a wallet, a staff and a single cloak, and to proceed barefoot to seek audiences and to preach the virtues of asceticism.\(^9\) Diogenes’s performance art was deliberately dog-like. He viewed the world from a dog’s point of view.\(^10\) A dog exhibits no shame, performs all its bodily functions in public, sleeps anywhere, eats anything available, and experiences no sense of deprivation or envy. The simplest life of the ascetic immunized persons from the pains of unsatisfied wants and relieved them of bloating and the inflammations of extravagance. The philosophers’ heroic control of desire kept them from coveting, theft and physical harm to others. Anecdotes about Diogenes show him asking the great Alexander, who had offered him reward, to step out of his sunlight.\(^11\) Seeing a boy drink from a stream by cupping his hands, he immediately discarded his drinking cup.\(^12\) Pleasures could only come from things nature supplied directly. There were the elements of a preference for the poor in his example.
Stoic cosmopolitanism

The Stoics followed the path of Crates of Thebes, the ‘cheerful Cynic’, who divested himself of a large fortune and chose to live in poverty. He gravitated to Athens and became a pupil of Diogenes, becoming in turn the teacher of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. The later Stoics admired much in the Cynic philosophy, particularly in what was regarded as fortification against adverse circumstances. As Greek cities lost their independent vitality when they succumbed to the successive empires of Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great and of Rome, the mental outlook departed from that of the traditional Greek philosophers rooted in the polis. ‘To be no longer citizens of an independent city-state implied the loss of the traditional bonds of Greek ethics.’ The old ideals of the polis were breaking down, and life for many became rootless and insecure. A powerful response was to seek security in one’s own inner resources, and in many cases this involved a radical attack on the rules and customs of the surrounding society.

There is a humane tradition in ancient Stoicism to which the modern ascete is understandably attracted. The idea of freeing oneself from unnatural desires led to expressing joy in submission to the natural order. This was never more exuberantly expressed than in Cleanthes’ ‘Hymn to Zeus’. Inner reason taught that conflict was useless and a demeaning of the human person: ‘what is necessary for self-sufficiency the wise man already has — so there is no point fighting over it’. The cosmopolitan is at heart a pacifist.

In a new enthusiasm (a very non-Stoic word) for a borderless humanitarian concern for human welfare, Stoicism has continued to undergo successive regenerations, as in the eighteenth century with figures like Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and Viscount Bolingbroke. According to Lisa Hill, the Stoics were the first cosmopolitans and the first universalists: ‘we are all fundamentally equal, members of a universal community by virtue of our common humanity’. The implication of the Stoic approach is that the lowliest person judged by prevailing values is intrinsically equal to the highest: there are no distinctions of gender, race, religion, wealth, poverty, educational attainment, physical prowess or physical beauty. All such externals are irrelevant to the inner worth of every person. All are endowed with reason, implanted in all by Nature at birth, which in itself is the measure of equality. The Stoics are somewhat ambiguous about this, since they value the ‘wise’ person who has understood the realities of reason; they make room

...
for the ‘proficient’ person, the one striving and ‘progressing’ on the path to wisdom; the ‘fool’ is rather disdained, despite having intrinsic human worth.

There is also a regional ambiguity in Stoicism. The Greeks talked about the sweeping away of the polis, the city-state, as they adjusted to rapidly changing circumstances. They took world citizenship seriously. Zeno, the founder of the idea of the oecumene, postulated a community of the whole world, transcending patriotism: ‘a community embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or of freeman and slave.’ It is ‘a state to which all [hu]mankind belongs, a state whose boundaries are measured by the sun’. As F. H. Sandbach points out, Zeno’s lost first book, Politeia, apparently used the term ‘constitution’ in an ironic way, ‘because he swept away all that the Greeks regarded as characteristic of the polis or organized society.’ Plutarch epitomized the book by saying ‘we should not live in organized cities or demes, but should think all men our fellow-demesmen and fellow citizens…’ (Plutarch, Moralia, 329 A). Sandbach says that the intention was not to envision a world state, ‘but that wherever men came together they should be governed by the rule of reason, which would be the same the world over.’ That outlook was not to last. The very poleis that were not honoured were indeed to be swamped by empires, starting with Alexander’s, that ruled ‘the world’.

**Roman Stoicism**

In Rome there was little disparagement of empire, which the statesmen justified as bringing order, security and unity to the known world. Roman philosophers justified their empire as providing one benevolent fatherland for all the world. In an excellent discussion, Lisa Hill points to the Roman claim, voiced by Cicero following his Stoic mentor Panaetius, that Rome’s dominance over subject peoples was justified as their protector and bringer of justice. It is often hard to see benevolence in Roman rule, which replaced a partially self-governing people with the pervading autocracy of the euphemistically titled ‘principate’. Yet there is a veiled truth in Cicero’s claims, even though he would not live to see the amelioration of ruthless autocracy. Stoicism provided an equally pervasive countervailing moderation of tyranny. C. H. McIlwain, following the German scholar Rudolf von Ihering, who promoted ‘a universalism which implies an essential individualism’, shows how a spirit of justice animated both public and private law in the second century AD. As a bearer of
rights, the state, *civitas*, is the body of its citizens, and its rights inhere in each individually. The emperor’s word, formally, had the force of law, but myriad jurists and governors, imbued with the Stoic philosophy, managed to interpret decrees and orders through legal fictions and ‘judge-made law’ so as to protect the privileges of individual persons.\(^\text{22}\) As Acton declared, ‘It is the stoics who emancipated [hu]mankind from its subjection to despotic rule, and whose enlightened and elevated views of life bridged the chasm that separated the ancient from the Christian state, and led the way to freedom.’\(^\text{23}\)

Nevertheless, each Stoic as a ‘citizen of the world’ had to accommodate this belief to the realities of statehood and empire. Martha Nussbaum relies more on the Roman version of Stoicism, including the eclectic Cicero, than on the Greek.\(^\text{24}\) Rome was an expansionist state, and the Stoic there had less interest in withdrawing from society than contributing honourably to its good. The Stoic virtue of indifference to pain and individual suffering suited the endurance required of soldier and statesman. Self-denial would require unstinting service to one’s fellow citizens through the offices of the state. The Roman Stoic would still proclaim him or herself a citizen of the world, but that remained a worthy fiction. It is uplifting to read what Roman Stoics wrote, but we need to remind ourselves that the Romans were, republic and empire, unremittingly ruthless.\(^\text{25}\) ‘What renders both Stoics and Kantian rationalism relevant to our globalizing age is their ambition to transcend confining contexts and parochial interests and to keep their gaze fixed on that rational core that is shared by people at all times and in all places.’\(^\text{26}\)

Martha Nussbaum implicitly distinguishes between Greek Stoicism and Roman when she turns to Cicero to delineate the forms of justice. Cicero was of course a leading statesman of the imperial republic not averse to praising himself for his role as consul in 63 BC. He was intimately attached to the institutions of the republic, which he defended to the last, finally paying for it with his life. Cicero’s philosophical interest continued to be focused on the welfare of the city-state.\(^\text{27}\) Nussbaum criticizes his *De Officiis*, ‘On Duties’, for not following through the full implications of Stoic cosmopolitanism; for Cicero it is unjust to harm someone, but it is also equally unjust not to prevent harm to another when it is in one’s power to do so.\(^\text{28}\) At this point Cicero’s justice clashes with the (mainly Roman) Stoic idea of indifference to externalities. A ‘wise’ person is indifferent to external pain, and if
right within the self, can withstand torture, rape, slavery. Cicero denounces aggressive war, which can only mean that his pride in the extension of Rome’s vast boundaries is justified in characterizing Roman aggression as a series of defensive wars resulting in the progressive subjugation of neighbouring territories. Nussbaum charges Cicero with the confusion of failing to recognize that poverty and starvation are harms to people which are preventable, but to which he seems indifferent, even though addressing them is within the power of the wealthy. Moreover, the duty of care is much more powerful towards family, neighbours, friends and compatriots, while help to distant humanity is only approved when there is no cost to the person who assists. ‘Cicero proposes a flexible account that recognizes many criteria as pertinent to duties of aid — gratitude, need and dependency, political and friendly association — but that also preserves flexible judgment in adjudicating conflicting claims. What is clear, however, is that people outside our own nation always lose.’

Nussbaum could have gone further by noting Cicero’s haughty attitude to the plebs of his own country, whose self-help measures he unequivocally labelled sedition.

Neal Woods says that Cicero was quite comfortable arguing for human equality while living with human inequality.

**Global dislocation**

In a strange if distant parallel to the sweeping away the vitality of the *polis* in the new imperialisms of the Hellenistic Age, globalization in the modern world sets new challenges. Unless we were to stretch the limits of concepts and define America’s global economic and military hegemony as a new empire, the modern global situation is more like a chaotic anarchy. As Benjamin Barber declares,

> It could hardly escape even casual observers that global warming recognizes no sovereign territory, that AIDS carries no passport, that technology renders national boundaries increasingly meaningless, that the Internet defies national regulation, that oil and cocaine addiction circle the planet like twin plagues and that financial capital and labor resources, like their anarchic cousins crime and terror, move from country to country with ‘wilding’
abandon without regard for formal or legal arrangements — acting informally and illegally whenever traditional institutions stand in their way.\textsuperscript{33}

To follow Cicero’s pronouncement that to stand by while people or peoples are being harmed when one has the resources to help is injustice, these ‘plagues’, wherever they may alight, require the attention of the resourceful. A universal commitment to human rights implies intervention on behalf of the international comity of nations into states where regimes have violated their people, as in genocide. Shaun Narine outlines the problem of human rights intervention in ‘subaltern’ states — ‘the weak, overlooked majority states of the international system’. Often emerging from colonial domination, certain young states are asserting their national sovereignty in the face of external criticism, and there is sympathy for them in that they are still in the throes of nation-building.\textsuperscript{34} There is a growing consensus that intervention is acceptable as long as the intention is only to prevent human suffering, that military intervention is used only in the last resort, that the response be measured and limited, and that it must have a reasonable expectation of success.\textsuperscript{35} In the case of intervention in the ‘subaltern’ states, there is a danger that it would be seen as a return of colonial paternalism. Narine thinks the American non-humanitarian intervention in Iraq, based on the mendacious pretext that America had to protect itself from the illusionary threat of weapons of mass destruction, could well have set back the case for humanitarian intervention a long way. There was no scintilla of Ciceronian justice in that intervention.

As David Lake argues, American interventions of an imperialist mode subvert the moral purpose of the modern state. He asserts that Americans have little idea that their geopolitics are in fact an example of imperialism, when troops are deployed on foreign soil, when military bases are set up on allies’ territory, and when preemptive strikes are threatened and carried out.\textsuperscript{36} The use of ‘drone’ unmanned aircraft is widely seen as an invasion of another’s sovereignty, especially in the case of Pakistan. The murder of Osama bin Laden without trial, though welcomed by many as a just retribution, was surely a vitiation of the principles of justice by which the United States Administration purports to stand. Any argument that this manoeuvre was designed to assist ‘subaltern’ states washes thin, since it was clearly aimed at American triumphalism, and its national self-interest voided
any scrap of justice in the action. Moreover, it was seen in Pakistan as a violation of its territorial prerogatives.

**The responsibility of states**

The idea of territoriality reminds us that, however impotent they may be in the face of some threats, states are still the components of the international community. And so it must be. The Greek Stoic idea of sweeping away states is not merely fanciful, but morally deficient. None of this is to say that nationalism is commendable, that patriot defines the good person, or that the most pernicious of Roman aphorisms — *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*, ‘sweet and noble it is to die for one’s country’ — is to be admired. First, it is in and through states that power is exercised, either for the detriment or benefit of humankind. Second, that it is in and through local communities that individual persons may take collective action, and that, at least in democracies, they may take a part in guiding the moral compass of the state.

Humane cosmopolitanism instructs us that in each person in the world there is an irreducible human dignity. Hill believes the fellowship of the world-state ‘is morally and ontologically prior to the positive republic of people’. Deontologically, perhaps, but not historically; Socrates, Diogenes, Zeno, were all the products of the cities they lived in, absorbing (even when repudiating) their traditional values. Many of the Roman Stoics, like Nero’s adviser, Seneca, were wedded to the regime of their nation. Marcus Aurelius himself ruled an empire. In any case, the timeless lessons of great Aristotle should not be lost here. A person’s human dignity is nurtured in close association with other human beings. It is in the concreteness of human relationship that our humanity is formed. Aristotle saw the immediate circumstances of human life to be focused on the family and the household, the village, and the community embodied in the *polis*. The city-state was the pinnacle of association in his world. It did not mean that all other associations were excluded. Aristotle, as we have seen, gave special attention to the *metics*, the resident aliens in Athens, which acknowledged the existence of their homelands. Indeed he was one of them, and in any case the *polis* in his analysis was a generic term. His school famously studied the ‘constitutions’ of some hundred and forty cities. In a limited sense, his *polis* was a cosmopolitan ideal. The polis was at the peak of his system because it was the climactic association that included all types
of people, with their different beliefs and their different aspirations in life. Yet it subjected them all to its discipline, enabling them to live together as neighbours and in friendship. That this was an ideal was obvious from the internal divisions and conflicts that took place within the cities, and these in themselves made ‘sovereignty’ (or for Aristotle to *kurion*) necessary. The *polis* was an association of ‘reciprocal and varied parts’, ideal in combining unity with difference. In the *praxis* of building this unity human personality was shaped:

If we hold that behind and beyond the *production* of law by the state there is a *process* of personal activity and personal development in its members, we may go on to say that the production should itself be drawn into the process. In other words, we may argue that the productive effort of the state, the effort of declaring and enforcing a system of law, should also be a process in which, and through which, each member of the state is spurred into personal development, because he [or she] is drawn into free participation in one of the greatest of all secular human activities.\(^\text{40}\)

At this point it is appropriate to introduce the concept of ‘human rights globalization’.\(^\text{41}\) As already implied, this does not mean the sweeping away of states. It does imply the education of the peoples and leaders of states into the verities of human dignity and equality, regardless of location and external difference. There is a large number of aid and benevolent associations, ranging from church societies and the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent, UNHCR, UNICEF, Oxfam, World Vision, Plan, and Amnesty International to the organization that colourfully incorporates globalization into its name: Médicins Sans Frontières. The United Nations Organization gives some observers hope for a future trans-national or world government, but in particular, its Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 implants covenants that, when ratified by participating polities, modify political behaviour within those nations.\(^\text{42}\) Even more topical in this context is the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The ‘ever-growing number of resolutions and covenants, covering almost every aspect of human life and human relations’ testifies to a growing potential for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Yet it is states that approve and ratify such conventions.
Neo-Stoicism

Martha Nussbaum invests much hope for the common good through education in Stoic cosmopolitanism as moderated to the modern world by Kant. The Stoic ideal was to see a common dignity in all humanity through their endowment with reason. To be practical in applying cosmopolitan ideals, Nussbaum argues that, for example, wherever children can be successfully taught indifference to race and to have goodwill towards neighbours, there is a Stoic triumph. The problem with this approach is that it is rootless, and in a deep sense, groundless. For in her care to avoid teleologies, Nussbaum denatures Stoicism by disconnecting it from its foundations. The basis of Stoicism is its discovery of reason in the fabric of the cosmos, and it is directly in response to that universal reason, called Providence, that the Stoic discerns reason in the being of his or her own person and in a neighbour. As Nussbaum declares: ‘In a sense there is a special dignity and freedom in the choice to constitute our community as universal and moral in the face of a disorderly and unfriendly universe – for then we are not following anyone else’s imperatives but our very own.’ Sandrine Berges echoes in more assertive tones Nussbaum’s reservations about divinity in Stoic thought, addressing the so-called ‘divine breath’ argument for human universalism: ‘it fails to convince a modern reader who does not necessarily buy into the kind of theism which the Stoics believed in — or indeed in any kind of theism’. This is a spectacular case of historical retrojection. Why should the ancient Stoic be concerned about convincing a ‘modern reader’? No doubt the Stoics believed in eternal truths transcending time and place, but modern sensibilities and world outlooks were unknown to them. Astonishingly, Berges goes on to claim that such divine fire explanations did not satisfy the Stoics themselves. He manages to bypass in a passage of Epictetus that he quotes an unequivocal reference to the centrality of God:

the citizen of the world ‘has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only of my father and
grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings — for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with Him — why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men?”

Hill understands the indispensability of the divine nature of the cosmos to the Stoics and adduces considerable documentary evidence to the point: the Stoic believed ‘that we are all fragments of divine intelligence with godlike potential’. More circumspectly, she also questions the likelihood of the modern person’s being persuaded by such reasoning. Nussbaum’s is a worthy humanist position, but it is not that of the Stoic, whose universe was complete and divine. In any case, the assurance of certainty in one’s own intuition, on which Nussbaum relies, is possibly suspect. The logos, the principle of reason in the human person, in the universe and in the order of human relationships, is from the first invested with divine fire.

As the acclaimed ‘Hymn to Zeus’ of Cleanthes exults:

Chaos to thee is order: in thine eyes
The unloved is lovely, who didst harmonize
Things evil with things good, that there should be
One Word (logos) through all things everlastingly,
One Word — whose voice alas! The wicked spurn;
Insatiate for the good their spirits yearn:
Yet seeing see not, neither hearing hear
God’s universal law, which those revere,
By reason guided, happiness who win.

Nussbaum would scarcely be impressed by a recitation of Stoic writers who show that their philosophy is grounded in reason as the principle of all created being. Her approach signifies a modernist disregard for the primitive, which extends to all who allude ‘to providence as at least a practical postulate, a reasonable hope’. The discovery of ungrounded reason in individual persons is an individuating tendency, and arguably less conducive to a cosmopolitan sociability than that afforded by an institutionalized belief system. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, along with Vico,
all our moral ideals ‘are nowhere to be found except as embodied in the historical lives of particular social groups’, given ‘expression in institutionalized practice as well as in discourse…’.  

A global ethic

Nussbaum would look in vain for an institutional body of Stoic teaching in the contemporary world, but ready-made institutions holding human life to be of ultimate and absolute worth are to hand, and are indeed globalizing. Islam is a global community, and worships Allah who is all merciful and compassionate. Christianity, worshipping God who is love, is globalizing, as are the other world religions. The Parliament of World Religions has set an agenda for restoring spiritual ideals to a troubled world. As led by the Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, in the ‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’, they have worked on an account of world sodality that would match the Stoic ideal but would also be consonant with the universal teachings of love and tolerance at the centre of world religions. ‘The indispensable role of religion is to give depth and cohesive power to an ethical perspective, which is not possible for a humanistic ethos of similar content.’

As Küng declares, finding a universal standard requires lifting humankind out of the contingent: it must be grounded in the unconditional, ‘by an Absolute which can provide an over-arching meaning and which embraces and permeates individual human nature and indeed the whole of human society’. Clearly Muslims willing to invest in the absolute sovereignty of God are already far down this road, and perhaps would be prepared to concede a similar devoutness to those holding parallel views in other world religions. In any view of the contemporary world order, the Islamic position must be taken into account. As Küng asks, do not religions ‘release a quite tremendous dynamic to liberate people from totalitarian systems, to protect human dignity, to establish human rights, and to preserve world peace?’

While we may recognize that individual autonomy renders secularization *sine qua non* for democratic politics, for millions of people the secular milieu leaves a void. This is amply evident for Muslims, whose spiritual leaders denounce secularism; but
for others, also, ‘demystification, secularization and rationality cannot so easily replace tradition, religion and mystery’. 57

At the centre of Küng’s endeavour to establish a global ethic is his openness to other religions, and his insistence that the whole enterprise depends upon cooperation among them all. Still deeply committed to his Roman Catholic faith, he strives to render all sound religious commitment as truly ‘catholic’. The security and integrity required for leadership in establishing a global ethic depends upon rootedness in one’s own faith. He argues persuasively that it is at the heart of Christian humility to recognize the ‘lights’ and the ‘words’ of other great religions. He charges his Catholic Church, long established as one of the truly global institutions, with a continuous reformation to moderate its rigid structures, to implement its traditional doctrine of subsidiarity, to underplay its centralized institutions, to reach accommodation with other Christian denominations as a precondition for rapprochement with non-Christian world religions, and to confront civilization with the imperative of peaceful solutions to world problems. 58 Dogmatic Catholicism shares a measure of fundamentalism with other Christian denominations as well as the non-Christian religions.

A sound approach to the creation of a world ethic requires an outright rejection of all forms of fundamentalism. Since the western world is obsessed with Muslim fundamentalists, Küng is at pains to affirm that not all Muslims are radical, and that there is much hope for dialogue with the many Muslims who do not reject modernization. Christianity and Judaism also have their fundamentalists, who, while exuding an intolerant religiosity, stem from ‘economic, political and social roots’. The expansion of religion is a given in the contemporary world. Many of its new manifestations are hostile responses to modernism, in the form of fundamentalist organizations to which Nussbaum could justifiably object through an appeal to reason. In their submission to the authority of certain established texts kept immune from scholarly interpretation, they subordinate reason to a narrowly conceived version of faith. Nevertheless, they are an unavoidable given in the contemporary cosmos, and their interaction, often uncomfortable, with social and political institutions constitutes a widespread cause of social disruption urgently in need of addressing by political authorities. Yet their very global nature threatens to fill a void that a rootless Stoicism has left. 59
Critics of Hans Küng

Of course these ideals are not confined to religious traditions. Michael Ignatieff, for example, insists that Europe has already espoused a global ethic independent of religious teachings. We have seen that the Greek polis explored many of the humane ideas that have endured throughout European civilization. Yet central ideals, like equality, freedom and justice were amplified and intensified by religious teaching, and given, in association with philosophies like the Stoics’, a cosmic significance. Küng argues that there can be no new world order of peace without a global ethic. Richard Falk, on the other hand, questions Küng’s approach: how can a new ethic produce agency for change? Moreover, how can a new dynamic be forged from a common ethic that is satisfactory to all the world religions Küng embraces? For the common ground shrinks to contain an ethic only involving humane treatment for every human person and a wide adoption of the Golden Rule, both long available from non-religious sources.

A more trenchant criticism of Küng’s project comes from the German sociologist, H. J. Krysmanski, who not merely questions the efficacy of a new global ethic, but denounces the ‘conceptual paucity’ of Küng’s enterprise. The issue for him is that Küng has not fully engaged with the political and economic realities of the current world order. To Krysmanski ‘The global economy is associated not with the production of useful goods, but with the psychology of financial markets, with the chivalry and crockery of corporate mergers, with the cathedrals of consumer culture.’ On a global level, ‘class struggle’ is the unrecognized reality, while ‘immiseration’ of the millions of the poor proceeds apace through the very processes of globalization. Such problems require action other than preaching. Krysmanski sees the whole globalization enterprise driven by the United States, a nation state acting in its own interests. He cites Benjamin Barber as one who is engaged with the problems of globalization. In Barber’s view, capitalism is consumed by its own success, dissolving into a trivial quest to create new markets for unneeded commodities. The wealthy in the industrialized world are cajoled by incessant marketing into purchasing more and more unnecessary luxuries, while capitalism leaves the poorer half of the world to languish without the means to purchase even basic necessities. In the United States, even religion is sold as a
consumable commodity, with televangelists marketing themselves as products. The prevailing ideology is to contrast the freedoms of US citizens with the bonds of others, whereas the liberty of the United States consists almost entirely in the ‘freedom to shop’. Along with the increasing commodification goes the ideologically driven outsourcing and privatizing of public activities, along with a persistent denigration of the role of government. ‘Privatization … is about terminating democracy.’ Barber likens the submergence of people beneath pervasive marketing to a communal totalitarianism, an echo of Sheldon Wolin’s powerful exposure of ‘inverted totalitarianism’.

Krysmanski taxes Küng with taking his message to economic elites and relying on the goodwill of industrial leaders. His view is that there is not much hope in this approach since globalization turns out to be ‘a vast process of commodification’, and it will never be in the interests of those who benefit from this process to modify their activity in the international economy. Küng's discourse, he alleges, is mired in moralist teaching, and being locked into the cause of bourgeois civil society, is not suited to engagement with the language of the young, for whom rapid advances in technology have set a new paradigm shift. In any case, Krysmanski charges that a paradigm shift ‘never came down from heaven’.

Despite a certain impatience with Küng’s cause, such as Richard Falk’s exasperation with his falling between ‘an irrelevant piety or a utopian dream’, there remains a case for a globalizing ethic, even if ‘reimagined’. Michael Ignatieff acknowledges the existence of a plurality of international ethical positions as embodied in the various organs of the United Nations and other Non-government Organizations, yet there is often a conflict between them, such as between the recognition of state sovereignty and universal human rights. States are accorded their autonomy, but as Ignatieff concedes, even democracies are allowed to go wrong, and in acknowledging local customs and ideals, particular areas are sometimes seen to undermine human rights. The global ethic, such as proposed by Küng, is required to ‘interrogate particularism’ and to engage local regimes in ‘adversarial justification’ of their actions and policies. Ignatieff thus acknowledges sovereignty as responsibility for ethical conduct. Falk, on the other hand, retains a positive role for religion, promoting an
'engaged spirituality,' [meaning] stepping forward in moments of crisis, as a matter of religious conviction, to oppose violence and injustice. Such exemplary action has certainly been taken in this historical period, becoming especially salient in the United States and Vietnam during the Vietnam war … Moving more positively in relation to religious institutions, it would seem important for religious institutions to view the forgiveness of debts to Third World countries, an initiative promoted in the Christian West by Jubilee 2000. But there are other opportunities as well to awaken the conscience of secular society and to deliver the message that religion is committed to inclusive ideals of peace and justice: religious leaders placing themselves on the frontlines between potential adversaries in warfare would, or could be, an immensely powerful impetus to celebrate and support the advent of a global ethic of the very kind that Kung is urging.72

Religion, democracy and the cosmopolitan ethic

Krysmanski’s secularist mindset obscures the vision that in the rise of the ‘Christendom’ that is his own European legacy, a ‘paradigm shift’ occurred.73 The arguments of the 1990s are in any case somewhat superseded by the worldwide change in consciousness following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Though scarcely the work of pious individuals, these attacks were inescapably associated with religious fanaticism; the secular sociological imagination is now forced to place the conflict between religious ideologies and the so-called ‘clash of cultures’ based on religious traditions at the centre of serious analysis. Küng’s project therefore takes on a new relevance and a new force. He himself is well aware of the change in consciousness since 9/11, and that since then he is no longer a voice crying in the wilderness.74 ‘What now seems clear to all is that problems of global terrorism, international crime, ecology, nuclear technology and genetic engineering threaten to overwhelm the world.’75 The global ethic has become the indispensable substructure of interaction between peoples if the earth is to survive its crises.

No case such as this can be blind to the human failings of religion.
Christianity must live with a history of crusades, Inquisitions, conquistadors, and interdenominational conflict, clergy abuse of the innocent and too often, neglect of the oppressed. Islam and Judaism also have their moments of shame. Yet, in order to lift the nations beyond petty conflict and hubristic attitudes towards their fellow humans, it would be beneficial to heed the humane teachings of the founders of the religions of the book. There is an unmistakable affinity between the teachings of Christianity and those of the Cynics and the Stoics. What is being urged here is that the Church, for all its failings, has carried forward globalizing teachings with all the humane investment of dignity and equality in all human beings: ‘There is no question here of Greek or Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and freeman; but Christ is all, and is in all’ (Colossians 3, 11 REB) — a passage that resonates with Stoic sensibilities. As Joseph Camilleri advises, when one makes a salutary distinction between ‘the spiritual culture of religion’ and its material culture, one finds that all the global religions: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism share with western liberalism ‘a sense of the dignity of human life, a commitment to human fulfillment, and a concern for standards of rightness in human conduct’.\textsuperscript{76} If the prophetic and ethical teachings of the great religions are taken seriously, they supply all the desired attributes of Cynicism and Stoicism. Indeed, there is a close historical affinity between the Cynicism and Stoicism of antiquity and the Abrahamic faiths,\textsuperscript{77} and in the latter case, ongoing global institutions are available for exploring these connections, and providing the basis for fruitful dialogue. One impediment to fruitful dialogue between east and west is an obstinate liberalism that, taking the doctrine of the separation of church and state to unnecessary extremes, inhibits potentially healthful channels of communication.

In her exploration of Cicero’s \textit{De Officiis}, Martha Nussbaum makes a strong case for humanizing international relations in the realm of foreign aid.\textsuperscript{78} There is evidence of poverty, deprivation, even starvation on all sides in the world. There is equal evidence of boundless riches in the developed world, much of it spent on unnecessary luxuries, and sufficient surpluses to redirect resources to the impoverished. Nussbaum adduces Cicero’s justice criteria to show that any neglect of expenditure by rich countries of the poor is indeed standing by while harm is done to them — a clear case of injustice. In the west we too often talk of viewing
the ‘less fortunate’ with ‘compassion’, as though it is out of our feelings of self worth that the poor may be helped. Nussbaum’s case — a corrective to Cicero — is that it is a straightforward matter of justice, not charity, that our fellow human beings be assisted by those able to help, individually and collectively. Her argument points up the utter disgrace of Australia’s unethical (and illegal) treatment of people seeking asylum here.

Finally, although this paper has focused on the responsibilities of states, it is urgent that the cosmopolitan ideal be absorbed into their fabric. The democratic paradigm is founded on the notion of human equality, dignity, autonomy and freedom. To achieve a truly global ethic, it is necessary that the cosmopolitan ideal radiate from states — particularly the democratic ones — to each other, and to all peoples.

8 Diogenes Laertius 6. 20.

Diogenes Laertius 6. 37: “A child has beaten me in plainness of living” (Hicks p. 39.)


Ibid. pp. 50-52.


Ibid., p. 426.

De Officiis, ‘On Duties’, 3. 5. 23.

Cicero, De Officiis, 1. 7. 23.

Cicero, De Officiis, 1. 4. 12.


Cicero, De Legibus, ‘On the laws’, 3. 19: (tribunicia potestas)… pestifera uidetur, quippe quae in seditione et ad seditionem nata sit; ‘the power of the plebs’ representatives is seen to be pestilential for it was born in treason for the purpose of treason.’


Shaun Narine, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Question of Sovereignty: the Case of ASEAN’, Perspectives in Global Development and Technology, vol. 4, nos
3-4, 2005, pp. 465-485, at p. 468, and citing Mohammad Ayoob’s theory of ‘subaltern realism’.

37 Horace, *Odes* 3. 2. 13.
44 Nussbaum, ‘Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, p. 22.
50 Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 72-73.


60 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Reimagining a global ethic’, *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2012, pp. 7-18, at pp. 8-9; cf.,

61 Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 64.


64 Ibid., p. 97.

65 Benjamin R. Barber, ‘Lecture on Consumerism’,


70 Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 77.


72 Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 79.

73 Jacques Derrida, Politics and Friendship’,


75 Küng, quoted ibid.
