Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Early post-Suharto governments were preoccupied with the business of democratic transition – establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the military from politics, and resisting the various threats to reform. In more recent years, however, foreign policy has attracted more attention, and the government (under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, first elected in 2004) has tried to improve Indonesia’s international image and enhance its role in Southeast Asia and in the world. The foreign policy priorities for 2013, set out by current Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, reveal plans for what The Jakarta Post calls a more ‘activist’ approach to Indonesia’s foreign relations. These emphasise peace, prosperity and stability – in both the immediate region and globally – and Indonesia’s role in pursuing these goals.

There is, of course, an instrumental dimension to Indonesia’s growing focus on foreign policy given the material benefits of a greater influence on the world stage. There are obvious benefits from developing strategic relationships with major powers and seeking stability in the immediate region. Moreover, a higher international profile may boost economic growth through foreign investment and negotiated trading arrangements. However, the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy also reflects shifting domestic political roles and interests. Changes associated with Indonesia’s democratic transition have broadened the range of voices in the foreign policymaking process. The ‘democratisation’ of this process has revealed a genuine desire by many actors – parliamentarians, activists, representatives of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) – to advance democracy and human rights as central political values in contemporary Indonesia.

To what extent, then, is Indonesian foreign policy shaped by these various factors? What impact does Indonesia’s emerging ‘democratic identity’ have on its foreign relations, and does this represent a real shift in political values? Moreover, to what extent might its foreign policy ambitions be constrained by continuing domestic challenges, such as corruption, terrorism and communal tensions? This article explores these questions by reviewing the recent evolution of Indonesian foreign policy, and analysing the roles of different actors and interests. I argue that Indonesia’s ‘democratic identity’ is certainly an important factor in its foreign policy. In this sense, a set of political values influences Indonesia’s changing role in the world. Democracy as a process also shapes foreign policymaking, as a broader range of domestic actors are able to express their views on Indonesia’s role, and influence the


decisions of political elites. However, domestic constraints are likely to continue to hinder Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions, and remind us that while Indonesia’s democratic transition bodes well for its future, there are segments of the population who are not engaged in the democratic project, and/or do not benefit from the country’s rising international status.

**A ‘more activist’ foreign policy**

In his annual press statement delivered on 4 January 2013, Marty Natalegawa set out Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. He outlined nine specific objectives for 2013, which are (in summary): to improve bilateral cooperation with strategic partners; to expand Indonesia’s non-traditional export markets; to intensify border diplomacy with Indonesia’s neighbours; to enhance protection of Indonesians overseas; to maintain peace and stability in the region; to ‘consolidate democracy and human rights values in the region and at the global level’; to strengthen regional economic resilience and growth; to contribute to global peace, security, and justice; and to promote a ‘just global economic and development order’.³

The statement thus set out Indonesia’s vision as a positive force for regional stability (for example, in encouraging a resolution to the South China Sea disputes) but also as an increasingly vocal player in *global* issues, such as violent conflict and economic problems. Natalegawa refers to Indonesia’s role in ‘high-level forums’ such as ASEAN, APEC (which Indonesia chairs in 2013), the G20, the WTO and the UN.⁴ He argues that ‘Indonesian foreign policy always makes [a] clear and concrete contribution’ in the face of ‘transnational and global issues...from natural disasters, food and energy security, to transnational crimes such as terrorism, trafficking and other types of threats’. Indeed, ‘whatever the source of challenge…Indonesia has projected itself as part of the solution’.⁵ Clearly the Indonesian Foreign Ministry seeks to position Indonesia as an important actor in multilateral diplomacy. A few days after Natalegawa’s statement, an editorial in *The Jakarta Post* described it as having ‘outlined the nation’s more activist foreign policy approach for 2013’.⁶

In addition to these various security and economic concerns, the 2013 foreign policy objectives include what we may refer to as Indonesia’s ‘democracy agenda’. As mentioned, consolidating democracy and human rights values ‘in the region and at the global level’ form one of the nine priorities for 2013. Natalegawa’s comments do not explicitly mention Indonesia’s own democratic transition, but focus instead on Indonesia’s role in encouraging ‘democracy and political transformation in the region’.⁷ This involves advancing democracy and human rights as priorities in the ASEAN Community (the creation of which was an Indonesian initiative); encouraging the development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; and founding and hosting the Bali Democracy Forum. Indonesia also encourages democratic transition in

---

³ Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
⁴ He also mentions the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement.
⁵ Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
⁶ *The Jakarta Post*, ‘Editorial’.
⁷ Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
Myanmar and (to a degree) in the Middle East following the ‘Arab Spring’. These initiatives reflect the promotion of democracy as a value, as well as a particular regime type.

‘Democratic identity’ in foreign policy

This democracy agenda in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy must be seen in the light of the state’s profound political changes since 1998. These changes have contributed to the promotion of a ‘democratic identity’ which is based on democratic values. There are few definitions or theorising of the concept of ‘democratic identity’. Jarrod Hayes notes that ‘the norms that inform democratic identity are agreed to include non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise, and transparency’. Similarly, in relation to Indonesia specifically, R.E. Elson argues that

the strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic identity…should become evident in the non-arbitrary exercise of the rule of law, a gradual decline in official corruption, an acceptance that universal norms of human rights are to be taken seriously and enforced, and the growth of a more vibrant civil society’.

Thus, the political values associated with democratic systems are evident in the concept of democratic identity. While this identity may be perceived as constructed by political elites, researchers find that the underlying values resonate with the majority of the Indonesian public. For example, a 2012 poll undertaken by the Lowy Institute finds that ‘Indonesians overwhelmingly believe in core democratic values’.

---

8 Since the fall of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime in 1998, competitive elections have been held in 1999, 2004 and 2009; the next elections (at the time of writing) are scheduled for 2014. There is now a separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary, and the military is under civilian rule (albeit with some continued political influence) and no longer holds seats in parliament. There is a genuine multi-party system in which many political parties engage in free and fair contests. A series of changes (at the time of writing, four since 1999) to the 1945 Constitution have increased the power of the House of Representatives (DPR) and introduced a number of checks and balances. Robust debate among parliamentarians indicates the desire of the DPR to engage in a meaningful way in the political process (in contrast with its previous ‘rubber stamp’ role under Suharto). In terms of civil liberties, Indonesians now enjoy a free press and relative freedom of assembly and organisation. Civil society organisations have flourished. See, for example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, Southeast Asian Affairs, vol.2010, 2010, pp.126-141.


11 The Lowy poll reports that ‘Almost every Indonesian adult (97%) agrees that ‘the right to a fair trial’ is important for them in Indonesia. There is similar near-universal agreement over ‘the right to freely express yourself’ (96%) and ‘the right to vote in national elections’ (95%). Notably, these views are powerfully held, with considerable majorities saying they ‘strongly agree’ with these rights. Of the four democratic values presented, the only one over which Indonesians are split is ‘the right to a media free from censorship’ (52% agree and 43% disagree), perhaps owing to some concerns over media integrity in Indonesia picked up in other polling’. However, we should also note that only 34% of Indonesians believe that ‘promoting democracy in other countries’ is a ‘very important’ foreign policy goal: Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2012 (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy), 2012, available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-poll-2012-shattering-stereotypes-public-opinion-and-foreign-policy.
This democratic identity is seen by political elites as beneficial to Indonesia’s international image. As Don Emmerson notes, President Yudhoyono seeks to ‘leverage his country’s stature as the world’s third largest democracy’ in its foreign affairs. (Indonesia is also the fourth most populous state overall). Indonesia is often seen as the most ‘successful’ democratising state in Southeast Asia. Further, Indonesia is the most populous Muslim state in the world. As Greg Barton points out, Indonesia’s recent political development demonstrates that – contrary to a widespread assumption – secular democracy and Islam are not incompatible. Indeed, the fact that Indonesia is a secular democratic state with a majority Muslim population has put it in a rare position in international relations. Hassan Wirajuda, former Foreign Minister (2001-09), emphasised this as ‘an important asset for Indonesia’s foreign relations’. This asset enables Indonesia to be – as President Yudhoyono argues – a ‘problem-solver’ and a ‘peace-builder’. Indonesia is, notes Rizal Sukma, ‘projecting itself as a moderating voice in the Muslim world, and as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West.’

In international organisations and regional forums, post-Suharto Indonesian Foreign Ministers have advanced the notion that democratic values in Indonesia contribute to its growing international role. For example, in September 2006, Wirajuda told the UN General Assembly that Indonesia’s international role had grown as a result of the inclusion of democratic values in foreign policy. More recently, after succeeding Wirajuda, Natalegawa referred in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2011 to the political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa (as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’). He reiterated Indonesia’s support for democratic transformation in these states, pointing out that

A decade or so ago now, Indonesia too went through a tumultuous process of democratic change. Today, as the third largest democracy, Indonesia is reaping the democratic dividends of such change. That is why we believe that political development, democratization, should constitute a priority item on our agenda.

---

Natalegawa noted that Indonesia’s creation of the Bali Democracy Forum – ‘the only intergovernmental forum for sharing of experience and cooperation in political development in Asia’ – was part of this prioritisation of political development and democratisation.20

Indonesia’s democratic values are also promoted as part of its regional role. For example, in Natalegawa’s statement at the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia in May 2012, he argued that it was ‘not without coincidence’ that Indonesia’s democratic transformation had been paralleled by change within ASEAN:

In 2003, while undergoing internal reform, Indonesia, as then Chair of ASEAN, introduced the concept of an ASEAN Community that is fully committed to democratic values and the promotion and protection of human rights. Since then, ASEAN has adopted its Charter, by virtue of which the member states committed themselves to democratic values and to the promotion and protection of human rights.21

Despite the political diversity of ASEAN states – among them democratic, ‘soft authoritarian’, communist, and quasi-military regimes – Wirajuda asserted in 2006 that ‘we must envision an ASEAN that is democratic and respects human rights’.22 Indonesia sees itself as the natural leader of ASEAN (given that it is the largest, most populous state and one of the founding member states), and seeks to promote its values at the regional level. At the same time, Indonesia represents the region (to an extent) in its growing global roles – for example, in its membership of the G20.23 Thus, Indonesian foreign ministers advance the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition and democratic values directly contribute to both its regional and international roles.

Motivations and constraints in the foreign policy nexus

There has, then, been a profound change in Indonesia’s international image since the fall of Suharto. However, one may ask whether the ‘democratic identity’ forming part of Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives is an image constructed and projected for instrumental reasons (e.g. to improve foreign relations, investment opportunities and so on)? Or does this

20 Ibid.
23 As the only ASEAN state to be a member of the G20 (the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), Indonesia can potentially represent its neighbours on certain issues, especially when it is acting as chair of ASEAN. In February 2011, for example, Reuters reported that Indonesia had asked the other G20 members ‘to pressure financial market players to not speculate on food prices after rising costs for staples such as rice drove inflation in Southeast Asia's biggest economy to a 21-month high last month’: Reuters, ‘Indonesia wants G20 to pressure mkts not to speculate on food’, 16 February, 2011.
projected identity reflect political values held by Indonesians? In a sense, both are true. Rizal Sukma, a prominent Indonesian analyst and advisor in foreign policy, argues that

the initial embrace of democracy was driven by “image” considerations, but as matters stabilized and reformasi began to produce more positive results, the levels of national conviction and confidence behind the “democracy talk” began to grow.24

Thus, while Wirajuda, Natalegawa and Yudhoyono have advanced the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition could benefit its international image, the political value of democracy was gaining traction internally. This is the case not only among political elites but also within the general public, the majority of which apparently supports the democratic project.25 Democracy has become both a political system and a projected identity.

When we consider Indonesia’s projection of a democratic identity in its own region, it seems yet clearer that this is not driven primarily by instrumental motivations. The political diversity of the ASEAN states has traditionally underpinned a regional norm of non-interference, including refraining from commenting on or criticising each other’s political circumstances. It is difficult to conceive what gains could be made vis-à-vis Indonesia’s relations with its neighbours from advancing democratic ideas within ASEAN. It seems that political values held by certain officials in regard to democracy and human rights are behind Indonesia’s recent ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in the region. Sukma argues that ‘Indonesia now views its own regional neighbourhood through the lens of democracy’.26 It promotes the inclusion of references to democracy and human rights in ASEAN’s core documents, such as the Charter, despite the tensions that this has caused at times with other ASEAN states.27 This reflects Indonesia’s new political identity. Interestingly, Sukma claims (based on his interviews with foreign ministry officials) that Indonesia’s support for democracy in a regional context is ‘also a tactical move to help deter antidemocratic forces inside Indonesia from reversing political reform’.28

The motivations for promoting Indonesia’s status as a Muslim-majority democracy reflect both a ‘constructed’ image and genuine change in political values. Particularly since the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings in 2002, many Indonesians have sought to resist the negative stereotypes of political Islam. In demonstrating its commitment to counterterrorism (for example, by attempting to eradicate

25 For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems found in 2010 that 75% of those surveyed believe that Indonesia is a democracy, and 72% prefer democracy as a system of government. Further, ‘a sizeable majority of Indonesians strongly (74%) or somewhat (4%) agree that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in Indonesia’: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘IFES Indonesia: Electoral Survey 2010’, Washington, D.C., pp.15 & 34, available at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Survey/2011~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/2010/20110119_Indonesia_Electoral_Survey.pdf.
terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya), the Yudhoyono government has sought to improve Indonesia’s international image and capitalise on its positive example. The projection of its democratic identity is also partly an attempt to overcome the damage to Indonesia’s international image given the actions by the Indonesian military and militias following the independence vote in East Timor in 1999, and in other sites of separatist turmoil such as West Papua. The Indonesian government has sought to demonstrate that the military has now come under civilian rule, through the creation of democratic institutions.  

‘Democratising’ foreign policy

Thus, the nexus among domestic factors and foreign policy is complex and multifaceted. In large part, this is because of the ‘democratisation’ of policymaking itself. Domestic politics has opened up to a wider range of views, and the number of actors participating outside government has increased. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar (prominent Indonesian analyst and former advisor to former President Habibie) notes, the political changes in Indonesia since 1998 have led to a re-structuring of relations between state and society, between the central government and the regional governments, and between the various institutions of the state, which in turn has transformed the ways that decisions are made.

More specifically, democratisation has ‘opened both the conduct of international relations and foreign policymaking to a larger number of actors’ than were involved when Indonesia was authoritarian. There is a wider range of voices attempting to influence foreign relations.

In the 2000s, elites recognised the need for wider public consultations and participation in the foreign policymaking process. Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that Hassan Wirajuda made

a conscious effort...to democratize the process of foreign policy making by actively consulting and engaging with think tanks, academics, religious groups, the media, and civil society organizations as well as with members of Parliament.

Marty Natalegawa later reiterated in one of his early speeches as Foreign Minister that he would continue this effort to ‘democratis’ the foreign policymaking process, and incorporate the interests of various stakeholders. During the ASEAN Charter process, for example, Indonesia was apparently the only member state which conducted extensive consultations with civil society groups, academics and politicians. Dian Triansyah Djani, the Indonesian representative to the ASEAN High Level Task Force which drafted the Charter, argues that

---

30 Ibid., p.127.
33 Ibid.
these consultations shaped Indonesia’s official position that democracy and human rights must be included in the Charter.  

Of course, democratic reforms mean that the Foreign Ministry is more open to public scrutiny as well as public contribution. Moreover, democratic transition inevitably gives way to some instability as communal tensions and intolerance movements that were previously repressed by an authoritarian regime are able to gain more leeway. The establishment of democratic institutions and civil liberties may facilitate the expression of anti-reform views. Thus, democracy as a ‘process’ may actually undermine democracy as a set of values. Sukma notes that Indonesia’s ‘democratic credentials’ have been challenged by such problems as corruption, terrorism, communal tensions, weak law-enforcement and religious intolerances. He argues that ‘these domestic challenges often threaten to undermine the democratic identity that Indonesia has carefully tried to project to the international community’. However, relative to the immediate post-Suharto period, such problems have been addressed in the context of increased stability of domestic politics. This has enabled the government to focus more on foreign policy.

Moreover, Indonesia’s economic growth and increasingly visible role in economic diplomacy are enhancing its international profile and providing incentives for other states to engage with Indonesia. In recent years, strong economic growth rates (at more than 5% since 2004, and at 6.2% in 2012, according to the World Bank) and expanding trade have underpinned claims that Indonesia is an emerging economic power. It has also facilitated Indonesia’s economic recovery from regional and global financial crises. As in other areas of foreign policy, there is an increasing number of actors with an interest in advancing economic diplomacy. Of course, widespread poverty and infrastructure problems persist, and provide a challenge to Indonesia’s future growth, and to the equitable distribution of its growing wealth (and thus to economic diplomacy). However, as Emmerson points out, 

---

37 Peter McCawley notes that President Yudhoyono ‘has made it clear to his ministers that he wants Indonesia to be an effective player in the G20’. He also is promoting Indonesia’s role in economic diplomacy by nominating ministers for key positions in international organisations. In 2010, he (successfully) nominated his then Minister for Finance, Dr Sri Mulyani, for the position of Managing Director in the World Bank group. In December 2012, he (unsuccessfully) nominated Dr Mari Pangestu, a former Trade Minister and current Minister for Tourism and Creative Economy, as a candidate for the position of Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Peter McCawley, ‘Indonesia’s WTO Candidate’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 January 2013, available at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/01/16/Indonesias-WTO-candidate.aspx. 
40 The World Bank estimates that 12% of the population were living below the national poverty line in 2012. This represents the continuation of a decline in poverty rates (17.4% in 2003 and 15.4% in 2008), but remains high relative to developed countries: The World Bank, ‘Indonesia’. Moreover, income equality is not narrowing as poverty rates decline. President Yudhoyono reiterated in January 2013 that alleviating poverty and narrowing the wealth gap are priorities for his government: Ezra Sihite, ‘SBY turns to KEN for advice on wealth gap’, The Jakarta Globe, 23 January 2013.
‘Indonesia’s perceived ascent is largely a product of its interaction with, and its portrayal by, the outside world’. Enthusiasts who are ‘encouraging investment in Indonesia because they believe it has a promising future…help to ensure the very rise that they anticipate’. Thus, perceptions play an important role in Indonesia’s foreign policy nexus and prospects for its ‘ascent’.

Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy is influenced by a broader range of actors, some of whom are advancing a ‘democratic identity’ as a crucial aspect of Indonesia’s international image. Democratic transition and economic growth have contributed to Indonesia’s self-confidence in its foreign policy, and to perceptions that it is a rising power – potentially even the ‘first Muslim and democratic superpower’. The objectives of Indonesia’s more ‘activist’ foreign policy are more likely to be achieved as a result, demonstrating the benefits of promoting democracy as a set of values. However, we must remain cognizant of the potential constraints on the making of foreign policy – of the impact of democratisation of the process itself. Some Indonesians seek to challenge the domestic democratic project; many have not yet benefited from its economic growth or rising international status. It is unclear whether the increased salience of democratic values in the polity can counteract the effect of these constraints in the long term. As we move closer to the elections in 2014, the foreign policy nexus will no doubt continue to evolve.

References


